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REcENT CAsEs
recovery by persons other than purchasers,'2 the New Jersey court
recently permitted the driver of an automobile to recover from the
seller even though there was no contractual relationship between
them.23 If the New Jersey court can find liability under the restrictive
wording of the Sales Act, then certainly the Kentucky court can find
liability under the less restrictive wording of the Commercial Code
and extend much-needed protection to ultimate consumers.
Wayne T Bunch
CoNsrtrrroNL LAw-Ex sIoNs oF hE BRowN CAs.-Negroes,
living m Mississippi, brought suit in a United States district court to
enjoin numerous defendants from enforcing Mississippi statutes which
required racial segregation of transportation facilities. The statutesi
applied to interstate and intrastate transportation. The plaintiffs con-
tended that the statutes deied them equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution. The district court judge, believing that a substantial con-
stitutional issue existed, convened a three-judge court.2 The three-
judge court decided to abstain from proceedings until the Mississippi
courts were given an opportunity to construe the statutes. A direct
appeal was made to the United States Supreme Court. Held: Vacated
and remanded. Since state statutes requiring racial segregation of
transportation facilities have been held unconstitutional it is error for
a federal district court to refuse to enjoin the enforcement of such
statutes; no substantial constitutional issue requisite for the conveumg
of a three-judge court exists. Bailey v. Patterson, 82 Sup. Ct. 549
(1962), vacating per curiam 199 F Supp. 595 (S.D. Miss. 1961).
Three cases3 were cited by the Court to support the proposition
that state statutes requiring racial segregation of interstate and intra-
state transportation facilities are unconstitutional. Two of these
cases, 4 however, involved interstate transportation and the statutes
were repudiated in both instances on the basis of the commerce clause
22 See note 11 supra for the pertinent provision of the Uniform Sales Act.
2 3 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
1The statutes m question are: Miss. Code §§251, 2351.5, 2851.7, 7784,
7785, 7786, 7786-01, 7787.5 (1956). Breach of peace statutes complained of
but not affected by this decision are: Miss. Code §§2087.5, 2087.7, 2089.5 (Supp.
1960).
2 Ostensibly required by 28 U.S.C. §2281 (1958).
3 Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S.
903 (1956); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 873 (1946).
4 Boynton v. Virgima, supra note 8; Morgan v. Virginia, supra note 3.
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of the Constitution. The third case, Browder v. Gayle,5 stands alone
as support for the proposition that a state may not require racial
segregation of intrastate transportation. This case is a 1956 per curian
afirmation of the decision of a three-judge court holding Alabama
statutes, basically identical to those involved in the principal case,
unconstitutional.
The Browder case is one of a group of per curain opinions extend-
ing the rule of Brown v. Board of Education6 into areas other than
education.7 Prior to the Brown case state-imposed racial segregation
was thought to be governed by the broad rule set down m Plessy v.
Ferguson" that segregation laws do not violate the fourteenth amend-
ment as long as the separate facilities provided are physically equal.
In the Brown case the Court rejected this separate but equal doctrine
as applied to public education. In a unanimous decision the Court
found: that the separate but equal doctrine had never been approved
or disapproved by the Court in a case involving schools; and that
racial segregation in public schools causes psychological damage to
the minority group by creating a sense of inferiority and denying
equal educational opportunities. Lower federal courts, chiefly on the
authority of the Brown case, have held state segregation statutes
unconstitutional in other areas, such as parks,9 beaches ° and transpor-
tation facilities." In this manner the Brown holding has been applied
in fields other than public education.12
When a federal district court is confronted with a state statute
requiring racial segregation3 there are, it appears, three possible inter-
pretations of the scope of protection guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. One interpretation would restrict the Brown case and
5 352 U.S. 903 (1956), affirung per cunam 142 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ala.
1956).
6347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7 E.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Pnincples, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
(1959).
8 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
9 City Park Improvement Assn v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir.), aff'd,
358 U.S. 54 (1958).
10 Dawson v. Mayor and City Council, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), affd, 350
U.S. 877 (1955).
11 Gayle v. Browder, 142 F Supp. 707 (N.D. Ala.), aff'd, 852 U.S. 903
(1956).
1'2 Cf. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn, 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir.
1953), vacated, 347 U.S. 971 (1954). The lower court judgment was vacated
and the case remanded in the light of the segregation cases.
i The statute must expressly, or by reasonable inference, impose racial
segregation or must have been interpreted to do so by the state courts. When
there is ambiguity as to whether segregation is imposed the state courts should
be given the opportunity to interpret before federal action Is taken. N.A.A.C.P.
v. Bennett, 360 U.S. 471 (1959).
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the rejection of the separate but equal doctrine to the field of public
education. This would be unrealistic in the light of the Supreme
Court's recent actions. A second interpretation would be that when
state-imposed racial segregation creates psychological damage as a
matter of fact, there is a denial of equal protection of the laws. This
would require a presentation of evidence to determine psychological
damage in each area of regulation. Since the Supreme Court has not
required such evidence it would be error for a district court to impose
this burden on the complainant. The third interpretation would be
that psychological damage to the minority group and a denial of
equal protection of the laws are necessary corollaries to any state
statute clearly imposing racial segregation.14 This would follow from
(1) the legislative intent of such statutes, which is to prohibit the
minority group from contact with the majority; and (2) the language,
reasoning and sociological authorities15 of the Brown decision. Under
this last interpretation a district court could and should grant mjunc-
live relief as soon as the segregative nature of the statute is made
known; a three-judge court, if convened, need do little more than cite
the Brown case as authority to hold the statute unconstitutional.
This analysis would account for the actions of the federal judicial
system and explain the rebuke in the principal case to the district
court which refused to grant relief. The Supreme Court has, however,
avoided any broad declaration of the meaning of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment and has been content to allow
the lower federal courts to extend protection, case by case, into areas
of state regulation other than education.16 Once extended, it is error
for a smgle-judge district court not to grant relief.
William H. Fortune
14 See Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Dectsons, 69 Yale L.J. 421
(1959). While Black does not use the term "psychological damage" his analysis
is very similar. He maintains that the intent of segregation, as shown by
lustory, is to confine Negroes to an mfenor station in life. From personal
expenence Black draws the conclusion that in a segregated society there is no
feeling of equality between white and colored.15 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 494 n.11 (1954).
10 See Dorsey v. State Athletic Comm n, 168 F Supp. 149 (S.D. La.), aff'd,
359 U.S. 533 (1959). But see Han Say Naim v. Nann, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d
749, vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), on remand, 197 Va. 734 90 S.E.2d 849,appeal dismsed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956). The Natm case involved a miscegenation
statute. The Virginia Supreme Court, after its decision upholding the statute
was vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court, refused to grant relief to the plaintiffs.
The U.S. Supreme Court, on appeal from this refusal, said the case was devoid
of a properly presented federal question. Was the Supreme Court hedging in
the face of the potential public reaction to extending the protection of the
fourteenth amendment to racially-mixed marnages?
